Incentive Centered Design

Making the Internet Safe, Fun, and Profitable

STIET News

 Press Release and  podcast -- Yahoo Answers users seek advice, opinion, as well as expertise in research by Mark Ackerman, Lada Adamic and STIET fellow Eytan Bakshy


 Press Release -- Bluffing in prediction markets research by Rahul Sami and STIET fellow, Stanko Dimitrov

 Podcast discussing the STIET research program with Jeff MacKie-Mason and Tom Finholt

  STIET video showing lifesize, uncompressed fiber-optic video conference from UM Atkins room to WSU via OptIPortal

Contact STIET

STIET Program
University of Michigan
2204 SI North 2112
1075 Beal Ave
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-2112
voice (734) 615-7210
fax (734) 764-2475

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Incentive-Centered Design for Spam

TAC poster A significant problem for managing information flow is the recipient attention devoted to processing spam email.
The identifying characteristics of pollution are present: recipients incur a cost (reading time, security risk) to determine whether the message is desired, and the sender generally has a better prior estimate of the message’s expected value. We developed an attention bond mechanism to provide incentives to reveal hidden information about potentially polluting email; AOL and Yahoo! recently announced they were implementing a related sender-pays system, but the community outcry illuminates a number of issues for ongoing research. We also developed a system to increase the benefits to advertisers of reaching customers through a different channel, thus reducing the desirability of paying to send spam to private inboxes.

More ICD in Action:

Trading Agent Design
Trust, Reputation and Recommendation
Community Lab
Market and Information System Design for Collaboration