Incentive Centered Design

Making the Internet Safe, Fun, and Profitable


 In the News: The Huffington Post ran a story on a study by STIET Co-PI, Professor Michael Wellman and STIET Fellow Elaine Wah that shows high-frequency stock trading is bad for profits, including those of high-frequency traders. Wellman also published an op-ed in TechCrunch about the work.

 40 Under 40! Former STIET fellow, Aniket Gune, has been named a Today Brand Innovators "40 Under 40" winner as one of the most innovative marketers under 40. Aniket is the Director of Social Media Acquisition at American Express, building end-to-end word-of-mouth social programs that drive card acquisition.

 Congrats! Former STIET fellow, Christopher Kiekintveld, has been awarded a CAREER grant for research on strategic decision making using computer gaming models.

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Apr 3 Seminar: Jacob Goeree

Thu, 04/03/2008 - 12:00pm - 1:30pm
Seminar Information: 

Jacob K. Goeree

Professor of Economics, Caltech

"Hierarchical Package Bidding: A Paper & Pencil Combinatorial Auction"

4-5:30 pm
UM: 411 West Hall
WSU: 313 State Hall (via videoconference)

Seminar Description: 

We introduce a new combinatorial auction format based on a simple, transparent pricing mechanism tailored for the hierarchical package structure proposed by Rothkopf, Pekec, and Harstad (1998) to avoid computational complexity. This combination provides the feedback necessary for bidders in multi-round auctions to discern winning bidding strategies for subsequent rounds and to coordinate responses to aggressive package bids. The resulting mechanism is compared to two leading alternatives in a series of laboratory experiments involving varying degrees of value synergies. Based on these “wind tunnel” tests the FCC has decided to use hierarchical package bidding in the major upcoming 700MHz auction.

Jacob Goeree
Seminar Speaker Bio: 

Jacob Goeree joined Caltech in 2004 and continued theoretical and experimental research on auctions. To effectively execute the different auction experiments he started the development of {Auctions, a suite of open-source Java programs to conduct web-based auction experiments, including complex combinatorial auctions. His auction research also has a practical component in a significant market design problem, i.e. using combinatorial auctions to assign spectrum. The FCC intends to replace their simultaneous ascending auction with a combinatorial format and use experiments to test several alternatives. Charles Holt (Virginia) and Jacob wrote the design for such experiments. More information is available at

Hierarchical Package Bidding: A Paper & Pencil Combinatorial Auction article pdf355.4 KB